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a b s t r a c t
EvoDyn-3s generates phase portraits of evolutionary dynamics, as well as data for the analysis of their
equilibria. The considered evolutionary dynamics are ordinary differential equations based on adaptive
processes taking place in a population of players who are randomly and repeatedly matched in couples to
play a 2-player symmetric normal-formgamewith three strategies. EvoDyn-3s calculates the rest points of
the dynamics using exact arithmetic, and represents them. It also provides the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
of the dynamics at the isolated rest points, which are useful to evaluate their local stability. The user only
needs to specify the 3 × 3 payoff matrix of the game and choose the dynamics.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Motivation and significance
Social and biological interactions among agents whomay adopt
different actions are usually modeled as games. Frequently, these
games are studied from an adaptive or evolutionary perspective,
leading to systems of ordinary differential equations knownas evo-
lutionary game dynamics. A paradigmatic example is the replicator
dynamics [1–4], which have become a standard reference case
when analyzing adaptive processes.
In general, many of the basic properties of evolutionary game
dynamics can be illustrated using gameswith three strategies [5,6],
and applications to the evolution of cooperation are often studied
in this framework [7]. To understand and analyze evolutionary
game dynamics with three strategies, one of the most useful and
intuitive tools are phase portraits, which are geometric represen-
tations of the trajectories of the dynamical system in the phase
plane. Generating this type of graph typically requires expensive
software or customized programming, and this can present a
considerable barrier for many researchers studying evolutionary
processes. EvoDyn-3s has been designed to overcome this barrier.
Specifically, EvoDyn-3s provides high-quality print-ready vec-
tor phase portraits for a diverse group of evolutionary game dy-
namics with three strategies. Using it does not require any pro-
gramming and most of its functionality can be run with the free
Wolfram CDF Player.1 EvoDyn-3s also calculates and presents the
equilibria of the selected dynamics and performs an eigenvalue
analysis of the linearized dynamics using exact arithmetic, a feature
that is not available in other programs and can be very useful for
theoretical analysis.
The softwaremost closely related to EvoDyn-3s is Dynamo [8,9].
Dynamo is also open-source software that runs on Mathematica,
and has also been designed to create phase diagrams and other
images related to dynamical systems from evolutionary game the-
ory. Dynamo can be used to generate graphs for single-population
games with 3 or 4 strategies and for some multipopulation games.
Dynamo is more flexible and general than EvoDyn-3s, but signif-
icantly less user-friendly, and it uses numerical approximations
rather than exact arithmetic. Another software somewhat related
to EvoDyn-3s is PDToolbox [10], which is a set of functions coded
in Matlab for analyzing some evolutionary dynamics, as well as
finite-population agent-based models related to those dynam-
ics. The Python package egtplot [11] creates phase diagrams for
the replicator dynamics. While narrower in scope and less user-
friendly than EvoDyn-3s, egtplot has the commendable feature of
running on an open-source platform. Lastly, ABED [12] (Agent-
Based Evolutionary Dynamics) is also free and completely open-
source software for simulating adaptive processes, but in finite
populations. It provides a complementary approach to the analysis
of evolutionary dynamics followed in EvoDyn-3s, in the sense that
many of the adaptive processes considered and implemented in
ABED (following an agent-based approach) can be approximated
–for sufficiently large populations – by differential equations cor-
responding to the evolutionary dynamics implemented in EvoDyn-
3s.
2. Software description
EvoDyn-3s is a computable document written in Mathematica
language. The document contains the executable program, detailed
instructions on how to use it, and the source code. There is no
need to compile the code. The program can be used directly, by
simply opening the computable document with the free Wolfram
CDF Player or withMathematica.
1 EvoDyn-3s’s full functionality requiresMathematica.
Fig. 1 shows the interface of EvoDyn-3s. The left part contains
a series of input boxes and various controls that are used to set
the values of all parameters. The right part shows the main output
of the program: a phase portrait in the 2-dimensional simplex, a
table showing all the isolated rest points and the eigenvalues of
the Jacobian of the chosen dynamic at each of the isolated rest
points (if the Jacobian is defined), and another table showing the
components of rest points (if any exist).
The effect of changing the value of any parameter (except the
payoff matrix) on the phase portrait and on the computation of
rest points and eigenvalues is immediate, i.e. there is no need to
compile or rerun the program.2 Thus, for example, the user can
gradually move any parameter slider and immediately appreciate
how this change affects the output of the program.
2.1. Software architecture
EvoDyn-3s conducts the following high-level operations, which
are sketched in Fig. 2:
• Creates the system of differential equations using the fol-
lowing input provided by the user: payoff matrix, baseline
dynamic, probability of random strategy µ, and –only for
dynamics Logit and Single-match imitative logit – param-
eter η. The generated system of differential equations is of
the form (ẋ1, ẋ2, ẋ3) = f (x1, x2, x3), where xi represents the
fraction of the population using strategy i.
• Solves the system of differential equations numerically for
various initial conditions and represents the solutions. The
number of initial conditions and the length of the computed
trajectories can be controlled by the user.
• Represents a series of orbits and arrows showing the
direction of movement in the 2-dimensional simplex
{(x1, x2, x3) |
∑3
i=1xi = 1 and xi ≥ 0}.
• Colors the background of the simplex according to the speed
of the dynamic, using the color gradient selected by the user.
• Computes the rest points of the dynamic using exact arith-
metic.
• Computes numerical approximations to the isolated rest
points. Shows them in a table and represents them in the
2-dimensional simplex.
• For dynamics where the Jacobian is defined, computes the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the dynamic at the exact
isolated rest points using exact arithmetic. Computes nu-
merical approximations to the eigenvalues and shows them
in a table.
• Shows the components of rest points in a table and repre-
sents them in the 2-dimensional simplex.
2.2. Software functionalities
EvoDyn-3s generates phase portraits of evolutionary game dy-
namics, colors the background according to their speed (i.e. the
modulus of the derivative vector), calculates the rest points, and
provides the eigenvalues of the Jacobian at isolated rest points
in order to analyze their local stability (in dynamics where the
Jacobian is defined).
The user can analyze any 3 × 3 game by setting the values aij of
the 3 × 3 payoff matrix, which represent the payoff that a player
using strategy i ∈ {1, 2, 3} obtains when interacting with a player
using strategy j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. There is also a list of predefined games
that the user can choose from.
2 The payoff matrix is not updated automatically, but only when the user clicks
on the button ‘‘update’’. This is a purposeful implementation, since the user often
wants to change several payoff values at the same time.
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Fig. 1. Interface of EvoDyn-3s.
The next parameter in the interface is the dynamic. A pop-
up menu shows the list of available evolutionary game dynamics,
which are detailed in the Appendix. These constitute what we call
here baseline dynamics, since they do not consider noise.
Parameter µ, called ‘‘probability of random strategy’’, or
‘‘noise’’, modifies the baseline dynamics by considering a flow of
individuals who adopt a random strategy when revising their cur-
rent one. This selection of random strategies may be based on mu-
tations, errors, or experimentation. Formally, if ẋi = fi(x1, x2, x3)
corresponds to one of the baseline evolutionary dynamics detailed
in the Appendix, the evolutionary dynamics considered when µ ̸=
0 are given by ẋi = (1 − µ)fi(x1, x2, x3) + µ( 13 − xi). Small
modifications of this sort can have important qualitative effects on
game dynamics (see e.g. [13,14], and [15]).
The user can also easily choose the number of trajectories
represented in the simplex (none, few, some or many), the length
of the lines showing those trajectories, and the color gradient used
to represent the speed of the dynamic.
ParametermaxTimeOut establishes themaximum time that the
program is allowed to spend calculating the exact rest points of the
dynamics. The default value is 1 s, which is enough in most cases.
Finally, the are two buttonswhich implement functionality that
requires running EvoDyn-3s in Mathematica:
• The ‘‘Export figure’’ button generates a camera-ready vector
pdf file of the phase portrait, including a table showing
the components of rest points and a table showing the
numerical approximations to the isolated rest points and
to their corresponding eigenvalues (for dynamics where the
Jacobian is defined).
• The ‘‘Generate full report’’ button generates a Mathematica
notebook detailing the equations corresponding to the se-
lected dynamics, the phase portrait, and the exact represen-
tations of the components of rest points, of the isolated rest
points and of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian (if it is defined).
The report also includes numerical approximations to the
exact values.
3. Illustrative examples
3.1. The hypercycle system
The hypercycle system is an ordinary differential equation in-
troduced in [16] to model the organization of self-replicating
molecules connected in a cyclic, autocatalytic way. The equation
can be represented as an instance of the replicator dynamics, so
the hypercycle system for a mixture of three macromolecules can
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Fig. 2. Overall architecture of EvoDyn-3s. Symbol N in the figure denotes a numerical approximation.
be directly modeled with EvoDyn-3s. Fig. 3 shows the values of the
parameters required to model this system, and the output thus
obtained. It is clear that all interior solutions of this hypercycle
systemconverge to the barycenter of the simplex, as proved by [17]
and [18]. EvoDyn-3s reports the exact eigenvalues of the Jacobian






, and their numerical approx-
imations −0.167 ± 0.289i.
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Fig. 3. The hypercycle system with three macromolecules.
3.2. Zeeman’s game
Zeeman’s gamewas introduced in [19] to show that asymptoti-
cally stable states under the replicator dynamic do not necessarily
correspond to Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS). Fig. 4 shows
the values of the parameters required to model Zeeman’s game,
and the output thus obtained. The interior Nash equilibrium of
this game (i.e. the barycenter of the simplex) is not an ESS but is
nevertheless asymptotically stable. This is clearly seen by noticing
that the real part of the two eigenvalues of the Jacobian at this
rest point is negative. EvoDyn-3s reports the exact eigenvalues of
the Jacobian at the barycenter, i.e. − 13 ± i
√
2
3 , and their numerical
approximations −0.333 ± 0.471i.
4. Impact
The following features of EvoDyn-3s distinguish it from alter-
nate programs such as Dynamo, PDToolbox and egplot, and make it
especially useful for research:
• The selection of evolutionary dynamics considered in
EvoDyn-3s (which is detailed in the Appendix) includes new
evolutionary dynamics, based on interactions with partial
information. Some of these dynamics are not available on
any other program and are studied only in recent papers
(e.g. [20,21]).
• Besides decimal approximations, EvoDyn-3s provides the
rest points of the selected dynamics and the eigenvalues
at isolated rest points (where the Jacobian is defined) using
exact arithmetic. This implies, in particular, that if a solution
is a rational number that does not admit a finite decimal
representation, EvoDyn-3s provides the rational number.
Similarly, if a solution is an algebraic number that does not
admit a rational representation, EvoDyn-3s provides the al-
gebraic number.3 Exact calculation of rest points is essential
for rigorous local stability analysis [20].
• EvoDyn-3s can be run using free software. It does not require
expensive software licenses, such asMathematica orMatlab.
EvoDyn-3s can be run with the free Wolfram CDF Player,
which offers desktop functionality for Windows, Mac and
Linux systems, and it also runs on some mobile platforms
(e.g. those running iOS). The only functionality missing
when running EvoDyn-3s on free software is the dynamic
creation of output files.
• EvoDyn-3s has been designed to be used through a simple
and intuitive user interface. It does not require any pro-
gramming knowledge whatsoever. The user only needs to
3 Beyond degree four, most polynomials do not have roots that can be expressed
in terms of radicals. An example of an algebraic number that cannot be expressed
in terms of radicals is any of the roots of the polynomial x5 − x − 1.
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Fig. 4. The replicator dynamics in Zeeman’s game.
specify the payoff matrix of the game and choose one of the
available dynamics using the mouse.
To provide an idea of the interest and potential applications of
this type of software, we note that –even with the barrier entry
caused by the need to own aMathematica license and possess some
(basic) knowledge of the Mathematica environment – Dynamo has
been used as supporting software for cutting-edge research and
for generating high-quality graphs in articles published in leading
journals in the field, such as Games and Economic Behavior [22,23],
Journal of Economic Theory [24], Journal of Theoretical Biology [25],
Theoretical Economics [26], Proceedings of the Royal Society of Lon-
don [27] and Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences [28].
5. Conclusions
EvoDyn-3s is open-source software that can generate phase por-
traits of various evolutionary game dynamics and data to analyze
their equilibria. It includes classic and new evolutionary dynamics,
it can run on free software and on different platforms, it does not
require any programming knowledge and it provides exact results
for rest points and their corresponding eigenvalues. Besides being
useful to analyze evolutionary dynamics, it is intended to generate
camera-ready high-quality graphs for publication.
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Appendix. Evolutionary game dynamics formulas
The baseline evolutionary dynamics implemented in EvoDyn-3s
are:
• Replicator [1–4]. The growth rate of each strategy share
is proportional to its prevalence xi and to the difference
(πi − π̄ ) between the expected payoff of that strategy πi =∑3




ẋi = xi (πi − π̄ )
• Smith [29,30]. The flow from strategy j to strategy i is
proportional to the prevalence xj of strategy j and to the
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where the function [a]+ is such that [a]+ = a if a > 0, and
[a]+ = 0 if a ≤ 0.
• Brown–von Neumann–Nash [31–36]. The flow from strat-
egy j to strategy i is proportional to the prevalence xj of
strategy j and to the expected payoff difference πi − π̄ , if
it is positive.
ẋi = [πi − π̄ ]+ − xi
3∑
j=1
[πj − π̄ ]+
• Logit [37–39]. The flow from strategy j to strategy i is pro-














Parameter η modulates the impact of payoff differences on
the dynamics. As η → 0 the impact of payoff differences
gets more acute and the Logit dynamics approach the best
response dynamics.
• Single-match imitative logit. This is the mean dynamics of
an imitation process in which players obtain a payoff in a
random match with another player and occasionally revise
their strategy. A revising agent looks at another randomly
chosen player (and his obtained payoff) and chooses a strat-














e aikη−1 + e ajmη−1
• Imitate if better in one match [40]. This is the mean dynam-
ics of an imitation process inwhich players obtain a payoff in
a randommatchwith another player and occasionally revise
their strategy. A revising agent looks at another randomly
chosen player. If the payoff obtained by the other player is








xj xk xm sign(aik − ajm)
• Test another in one match [20,41]. This is the mean dy-
namics of an adaptive process in which players obtain a
payoff in a random match with another player and occa-
sionally revise their strategy. A revising agent tests another
alternative random strategy in a new random match. If the
outcome obtained with the alternative strategy is preferred,










[xk xm (xj I{aik>ajm} − xi I{ajm>aik})]
where the ‘‘greater than’’ function I{a>b} is defined by
I{a>b} = 1 if a > b and I{a>b} = 0 if a ≤ b.
• Best response to one random player [21,42,43]. This is the
mean dynamics of an adaptive process in which players
occasionally revise their strategy. A revising agent looks at
another randomly chosen player and adopts a best response







where BR(j) is the subset of strategies that are a best re-
sponse to strategy j, i.e., {i : aij = Maxk (akj)}.
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